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A Question of Honour: 
Why the Taliban Fight and What to Do About It
Scott Atran
University of Michigan
Abstract
Afghanistan is not like Iraq. What may work well in Iraq, or elsewhere, may not be a wise pol-
icy in Afghanistan. The original alliance between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda was largely one of 
convenience between a poverty-stricken national movement and a transnational cause that 
brought material help. Unlike Al-Qaeda, the Taliban are interested in their homeland, not ours. 
The Taliban know how costly keeping Qaeda can be. Even if the Taliban took control of 
Afghanistan it is not clear that Al-Qaeda would be welcome again. Afghanistan and the tribal 
areas of Pakistan must be dealt with on their own terms. There’s a good chance that enough of 
the factions in the Taliban coalition would decide for themselves to disinvite their troublesome 
guest if we contained them by maintaining pressure without trying to subdue them or hold 
their territory, intervening only when we see movement to help Al-Qaeda or act beyond the 
region. We’re winning against Al-Qaeda and its kin in places where anti-terrorism eﬀorts are 
local and built on an understanding that the ties binding terrorist networks today are more cul-
tural and familial than political or ideological.
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Although reading more than a thousand years of Arab and Muslim history 
would show little pattern to predict the attacks of 9/11, the present predica-
ment in Afghanistan rhymes with the past like the lines of a limerick.1
Afghanistan is not like Iraq. And what may work well in Iraq, like prop-
ping up governments and pumping in troops, may not be so wise for Afghan-
istan. Iraq is part of Mesopotamia, home to world’s ﬁrst centralised 
civilisation and government. Its relatively ﬂat and open geography and great 
1 This article develops in depth ideas originally outlined in S. Atran (2009) “To Beat 
Al Qaeda, Look to the East”, New York Times, 13 December, available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/13/opinion/13atran.html. Support was provided by the U.S. National Science 
Foundation, Air Force Oﬃce of Scientiﬁc Research, Oﬃce of Naval Research, and Army 
Research Oﬃce.
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rivers have favoured intensive agricultural production and urban develop-
ment, together with easy commerce and communication, throughout history. 
In Mesopotamian Iraq, central governments supported by large standing 
armies have brought order and stability. Not so in Afghanistan, nor the bor-
der regions of Pakistan, which are also not like Vietnam in the 1960s and 
1970s, where a strong state backed communist insurgents.
The harsh, mountainous, landlocked country of Afghanistan stands at the 
midway mark of the ancient Silk Road connecting China and India to the 
Middle East and Europe. Its critical geostrategic location has been coveted by 
a never-ending stream of foreign interlopers, from Alexander the Great to the 
generals of Soviet Russia and the United States. In 1219, Genghis Khan laid 
waste to the land because its people chose to resist rather than submit. He 
exterminated every living soul in cities like Balkh, the capital of the ancient 
Greek province of Bactra, home to Zoroastrianism, and a centre of Persian 
Islamic learning. With urban centres devastated, the region became an agrar-
ian backwater under Mongol rule. In 1504, Babur, a descendant of both 
Genghis Khan and the Persianised Mongol ‘Timur the Lame’ (Tamerlane), 
established the Moghul Empire in Kabul and dominated India. However, by 
the early 1700s, central government in Afghanistan, which had never been 
strong for long, had collapsed and much of the region was self-ruled by the 
Afghans, also known as the Pashtun¸ ﬁercely independent tribes who speak 
Pashto, a Persian dialect.
The Pashtun, almost all of whom are Sunni Muslim, are divided into a few 
major tribal confederations, consisting of numerous tribes and sub-tribes. In 
1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani founded a regional empire based on cross-tribal 
alliances between the Durrani confederation, which provided the political 
and landowning elite that governed the country, and the larger Ghilzai con-
federation, which provided the ﬁghters. This paved the way for the founda-
tion of modern Afghanistan.
In the 19th century, the country became a buﬀer state in ‘The Great Game’ 
between British India and Czarist Russia’s ambitions in Central Asia. The 
British gave up trying to occupy and rule Afghanistan after the ﬁrst Anglo-
Afghan War, which ended in 1842 when tribal forces slaughtered 16,500 sol-
diers and 12,000 dependents of a mixed British-Indian garrison, leaving a 
lone survivor on a stumbling pony to carry back the news. Still, the British 
remained determined to control Afghanistan’s relations with outside powers. 
In 1879, they deposed the Afghan Amir following his reception of a Russian 
mission at Kabul. But in keeping with anti-colonial stirrings unleashed in the 
wake of World War I, the Afghans wanted to recover full independence over 
foreign aﬀairs, which they did following the Third Anglo-Afghan War from 
1919 to 1921. At least until 1979, when the Russians (Soviets) returned for 
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another go at control, followed in 2001 by the American-led invasion (with 
Britain as the junior partner) to bring Afghanistan into the Western camp 
after its brief spell of independence under Taliban control.
All Pashtun trace their common descent from one Qais Abdur Rashid, 
through his youngest son Karlan. Folklore has it that the Afridi tribesmen of 
the Karlandri confederation are Rashid and Karlan’s most direct descendants. 
Although smaller than the Durrani and Ghilzai confederations, the Karlandri 
confederation, which straddles the present Afghan-Pakistan border, includes 
the most bellicose and autonomous of the Pashtun tribes. From the time of 
Herodotus and Alexander, historians have described how the Afridis control-
led and taxed the passage of other tribes and foreigners through the Khyber 
Pass. The British thought the Afridi fearsome characters and ﬁne shots, and 
so paid them oﬀ handsomely or, preferably, enlisted them in the Khyber 
Riﬂes and other crack frontier units to help them keep the other Karlandri 
tribes at bay, most notably the Wazirs of North Waziristan and the Mehsuds 
of South Waziristan.
Although the Wazirs and Mehsuds were hereditary enemies who constantly 
fought one another, they would unite in Jihad against any foreign attempt to 
gain a foothold in Waziristan, spurred on by local religious leaders (mullahs) 
and their martyrdom-seeking students (talibs). The British army missionary 
T. L. Pennell described the situation a century ago in Among the Wild Tribes 
of the Afghan Frontier:
Waziristan (the country of the Wazirs and Mahsuds), is severely left alone, provided 
the tribes do not compel attention and interference by the raids into British territory; 
which are frequently perpetrated by their more lawless spirits . . . tribal jealousies and 
petty wars are inherent . . . Hence the saying, ‘The Afghans of the frontier are never at 
peace except when they are at war!’ For when some enemy from without threatens 
their independence, then, for the time being, are their feuds and jealousies thrown 
aside, and they ﬁght shoulder to shoulder, to resume them again when the common 
danger is averted. Even when they are all desirous of joining some jihad, they remain 
suspicious of each other . . . Mullahs sometimes use the power and inﬂuence they pos-
sess to rouse the tribes to concerted warfare against the inﬁdels . . . The more fanatical 
of these Mullahs do not hesitate to incite their pupils [taliban] to acts of religious 
fanaticism, or ghaza, as it is called. The ghazi is a man who has taken an oath to kill 
some non-Mohammadan, preferably a European, as representing the ruling race; but, 
failing that, a Hindu or a Sikh is a lawful object of his fanaticism. The Mullah instills 
in him the idea that if in doing so he loses his own life, he goes at once to Paradise . . . 
and the gardens which are set apart for religious martyrs.2
2 Pennell, T. L. (1909) Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier: A Record of Sixteen Years’ 
Close Intercourse with the Natives of the Indian Marches. London: George Bell & Sons, Pp. 48–49, 
60–61, 116, 124.
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After much bloodletting, the British realised that any attempt at permanent 
occupation or full-scale paciﬁcation of the warring tribes would only unite 
them, and that it would be nearly impossible to defeat their combined forces 
without much greater military and ﬁnancial means than Britain could aﬀord. 
So Britain ﬁnally settled on a policy of containment, institutionalised by 
Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India. Having come to India in 1899, shortly after a 
bad spate of Wazir and Mehsud uprisings, Curzon established the North 
West Frontier Province (NWFP) as a buﬀer zone, splitting the tribal areas 
between Afghanistan and that part of British India which is now Pakistan. 
‘Our policy was to interfere as little as possible with the internal organisation 
and independence of the tribes,’ he said, and by control and conciliation 
‘endeavour to win them over’ to secure the frontier.3
Control involved withdrawing British forces from direct administration of 
the frontier region, including parts of Afghanistan, ‘for which our Regular 
troops were neither recruited, nor suited,’ Curzon noted. Some well-defended 
outposts would remain to protect the roads that were being built to help 
integrate and secure the tribes through commerce (Afghanistan still has no 
railroad network). But the government would rely mostly on ‘forces of tribal 
Militia, levies and police, recruited from the tribesmen themselves,’ though 
trained and directed by English oﬃcers. Conciliation meant subsidising the 
‘friendlies’ to hold oﬀ the ‘hostiles’ until they, too, realised that it was in their 
own self interest to accept British bounty for abandoning their traditional 
‘outlaw’ ways, or at least raids against British territory.
After the partition of India in 1947, the successor state of Pakistan contin-
ued the policy of co-opting ‘friendlies’ with various incentives (arms, money, 
political position) to hold oﬀ the hostiles. Going a step further, the country’s 
founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, decided that concentrations of regular 
troops from the Brigade level up would be evacuated from Waziristan and the 
other Federally Adminstered Tribal Areas wedged between the NWFP and 
Afghanistan. He aptly called his plan ‘Operation Curzon.’4
Thirty Years of War and the Rise of the Taliban
The Pashtun comprise over 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, about 
the same as a century ago. The Tajiks contribute almost 30 per cent; the 
3 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1908/feb/26/india-north-west-frontier-
policy#S4V0184P0_19080226_HOL_23.
4 Hussain, H. (2004) “Waziristan — The Past”. Defence Journal (November). Available at: 
http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/analysis/waziristanthe_past_overview_of.htm.
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Hazara and Uzbeks each just a bit less than 10 per cent. The Pashtun have 
long dominated the country though, both politically and militarily. Except 
for a brief nine-month interlude in 1929, Durranis lorded over the country 
until the Communist takeover in 1978 that killed Mohammed Daoud Khan.
Daoud’s government and its predecessor had been very wary of introduc-
ing reforms, especially concerning the status of women. They feared the kind 
of unrest that had unseated Amanullah, the Durrani Amir who had fought 
the British in the Third Anglo-Afghan War to gain full independence for his 
country in 1921. Inspired by the policies of Turkey’s secular reformer Kemal 
Figure 1: Map of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FPO
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Ataturk, Amanullah embarked on an ambitious modernisation programme, 
resulting in a rebellion of Pashtun tribal and religious leaders that removed 
him from the throne in 1929. He was initially replaced by an ethnic Tajik 
whom the Pashtuns came to view as a usurper. Then, the tribesmen threw 
their support behind one of Amanullah’s generals, Zahir’s father, who had 
been exiled by Amanullah for questioning the wisdom of the Amir’s policies. 
He sacked Kabul in 1929 with mostly Wazir and Mehsud tribal forces and 
became king. Despite the assassination of Zahir’s father in 1933 and Daoud’s 
coup in 1973, Afghanistan enjoyed half a century (1929–1978) of relative 
peace and accommodation between the central government and the tribes. 
This was followed by thirty years of war that could still go on much longer.
This thirty years of war began when the Communist government threw 
caution to the wind and immediately proclaimed a secular socialist govern-
ment that tried to force far-reaching land reforms and push programmes to 
better the status of women. The tribes rebelled, the regime was about to col-
lapse, and so the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to ‘save 
socialism.’ The radical reforms were rescinded, but the Soviet occupation 
generated even greater tribal resistance. The call to jihad brought in Muslim 
volunteers from around the world, together with ﬁnancial and logistical sup-
port from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. In 1980, then-U.S. 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, swabbed in a Pashtun turban 
and waving an AK-47 near the Khyber Pass, exhorted the mujahedin to ﬁght 
‘because your cause is right and God is on your side . . . Allahu Akbar!”5
Pashtun traditionally identify themselves ﬁrst and foremost by qawm, 
which Westerners usually translate as ‘clan,’ a sub-tribal identity traditionally 
based on kinship and residence.* In the past, male members of each qawm 
were invariably blood-related. But the change towards a market economy has 
somewhat lessened the strict importance of kin relations and encouraged new 
qawms based on patron-client economic networks.6 More recently, qawm has 
come to mean any segment of society bound by solidarity ties, whether by 
kinship and residence, occupation and patron-client relations, religious inter-
ests or dialect. A qawm can involve a varying number of individuals, depend-
5 Madeleine Albright responded to questions by Atran and others at “The Strategic Impor-
tance, Causes, and Consequences of Terrorism: A Multidisciplianry Colloquium” at the Uni-
versity of Michigan in Ann Arbor on 11 March 2004.
* The Pashtun qawm shares origins with its Arab namesake. The fundamental living unit of 
the Arabs was the family tent (khaymah); a cluster of tents formed an encampment (hayy) whose 
members constituted a qawm. The tribe (qabilah) was a grouping of a number of kindred 
qawm.
6 Rasuly-Paleczek, G. (2001) “The Struggle for the Afghan State: Centralization, National-
ism and their Discontents”, in W. van Schendel and E. Zürcher (eds.) Identity Politics in Central 
Asia and the Muslim World. London: I. B. Tauris. 
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ing on context and situation. During the Soviet-Afghan War, as in the present 
Taliban insurgency, the notion of qawm became even more ambiguous and 
ﬂexible to allow for strategic manipulations of identity to carry out group 
actions in shifting contexts.7 Especially among the hill tribes, qawms are still 
heavily family-oriented and very much the primary reference groups for mili-
tary action.
The mujahedin fought primarily to defend their faith and community 
against a hostile ideology, an oppressive government, and a foreign invader: 
‘It was a spontaneous defence of community values and a traditional way of 
life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or international 
political organisations.’8 Their tactics diﬀered from place to place, qawm to 
qawm. Although few guerrilla commanders were military professionals, 
Afghanistan under Daoud and Zahir had a conscript army in which most 
22-year-old males served two years. The tribes scorned professional soldiers as 
mercenaries, but they had supported the draft because it provided basic mili-
tary know-how that helped boys become men even in times of peace. Friend-
ships made during military service also later eased cooperation between 
guerrilla groups.9
Over the course of the War, state institutions decayed. There were also pro-
found changes in local communities that helped pave the way for the emer-
gence of the Taliban after the War. The old elite of large landowners and 
tribal elders ceded to a new cadre of younger military hotshots from less pres-
tigious backgrounds who began to play an important role in the administra-
tion of community life. At the same time, there was a sharp expansion of the 
role of the Islamic clergy (ulema). Clerics with an advanced madrassah educa-
tion (malawi) and knowledge of religious law (sharia) enjoyed greater prestige 
than the boorish mullahs. The ulema were able to leverage this prestige into 
political inﬂuence that cut across tribal boundaries by networking with Paki-
stani political parties that funnelled money and supplies to the mujahedin 
(some provided to them by the U.S. via Pakistani Intelligence), and by mor-
ally restraining military commanders from arbitrary actions that beneﬁtted 
only themselves and their kin.10
 7 Tapper, R. (1988) “Ethnicity, Order, and Meaning in the Anthropology of Iran and 
Afghanistan”, in J.-P. Digard (ed.) Le Fait Ethnique en Iran et en Afghanistan. Paris: Editions du 
CNRS.
 8 Ahmad, A. and L. Grau (2002) Afghan Guerilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen 
Fighters. Zenith Press. 
 9 Roy, O. (1994) The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
Pp. 158–159.
10 Roy, O. (1990) Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press.
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Soviet forces withdrew in February 1989; however, it was only after the 
Soviet Union collapsed, ending all outside assistance to a local client-regime 
that was holding on by the skin of its teeth, that Kabul fell to the mujahedin 
forces in April 1992. The mujahedin immediately took to ﬁghting among 
themselves for control of the city and the countryside. A near-state of anar-
chy prevailed as demobilised and penniless warriors became outlaws that 
preyed even on women and the weak. Reacting to a series of outrages around 
the southern city of Kandahar, a small group of religious students (taliban), 
led by their teacher Mullah Omar, killed the worst of the bandits in 1994 
and proclaimed a new movement, the Taliban, that would unify the country 
by using the sword of pure virtue to cut away all vices (including the playing 
of music, shaving the face, and educating women). With Pakistan’s aid, their 
power spread to other Pashtun areas. Taliban forces took Kabul in 1996 
(although Mullah Omar chose to remain in Kandahar) and extended control 
over the whole country, except the Tajik-controlled north-east, by 1998.
Final victory came to the Taliban on 9 September 2001, when, with Al-
Qaeda’s assistance, a suicide bomber posing as a journalist managed to kill 
Ahmad Shah Massoud, the legendary Tajik commander of the Northern Alli-
ance known as ‘The Lion of Panshir.’ Two days later, Al-Qaeda attacked the 
United States apparently without informing the Taliban leadership of any 
plans. Most probably, Bin Laden assumed that by helping the Taliban to win 
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was free to use the country as its base from which to 
launch attacks. Taliban religious leaders, however, judged that Bin Laden had 
abused his status as a ‘guest’ in the country and urged Mullah Omar to 
‘invite’ Bin Laden to leave.
The U.S. would not wait upon such customs, which were judged insincere 
(but wrongly so, as we’ll see later). With U.S. air and special forces to clear 
the way, the Northern Alliance entered Kabul in November 2001. In Afghan-
istan, a governing coalition rapidly emerged of Afghanistan’s Durrrani Presi-
dent Hamid Karzai and Tajik-led successors of the U.S.-backed Northern 
Alliance. The Taliban opposition in the country has come to include disaf-
fected Durranis, Ghilzai, and factions of the Karlandri confederation (such as 
the Haqqani of the Zadran tribe, whose leader Jalaluddin was called ‘good-
ness personiﬁed’ during the Soviet-Afghan War by then-Congressman Char-
lie Wilson,11 and is today one of Al-Qaeda’s principal allies.)
When U.S.-backed forces ﬁrst swept through Afghanistan, many of the 
remaining Taliban commanders ﬂed for sanctuary in the Pashtun border 
regions of Pakistan. The Americans then began bombing these sanctuaries 
11 Crile, C. (2007) Charlie Wilson’s War. New York: Grover Press.
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from the air and intermittently prodded the Pakistani army to make ﬁtful 
incursions into tribal areas. The result was that hitherto unaligned Pakistani 
Pashtun began joining forces with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This, in 
turn, has enabled Al-Qaeda to survive, the Afghan Taliban to regroup and 
take the ﬁght back into Afghanistan, and the Pakistani Taliban to emerge as a 
threat to Pakistan itself.
Pakistani Taliban are mostly enlisted from factions of the Mehsud, Wazir 
and other Karlandri tribes. Before 2001, many of these tribal factions were 
largely unresponsive to the Afghan Taliban programme to homogenise and 
integrate tribal customs, and suppress tribal independence, under a single 
religious administration that claimed strict adherence to sharia (in fact, a 
peculiarly Pashtun version of sharia with a heavy dose of tribal custom). The 
Pashtun border tribes became outraged at the Pakistani government too for 
sending troops into the area and allowing Americans to bomb their home-
lands in an eﬀort to kill oﬀ Al-Qaeda and root out the Afghan Taliban. In 
Pakistan today, the designation ‘Taliban,’ or ‘religious students,’ applies to 
almost any Pashtun tribesman who takes up holy war against the inﬁdel — 
the U.S.-led coalition — or those reckoned to act in the service of inﬁdels. 
There’s no overarching Taliban organisation that commands and controls the 
actions of its numerous tribal factions and unaﬃliated adherents (often foot 
soldiers who ﬁght for pay, status, and other rewards).
In the past, the Afghan Taliban tried to suppress tribal sentiments and the 
role of the qawms. Now, the new Taliban vies with the U.S.-backed coalition 
to enlist these sentiments to turn the qawms into militia. Both sides have 
grudgingly bowed to the fact that Pashtun politics are indeed truly local, and 
that local politics must be mastered before grander schemes are tried. The 
problem is that the Taliban are far better at this than are we.
A Matter of Honour
A key factor helping the Taliban today is the moral outrage of the Pashtun 
tribes against those who would deny them autonomy of action, including a 
right to bear arms to defend their tribal canon, known as Pashtunwali. Its 
sacred tenets include protecting women’s purity (namus), the right to personal 
revenge (badal ), the sanctity of the guest (melmastia), and sanctuary (nana-
wati). All Pashtun tribes organise along patrilineages, where inheritance, 
wealth, social prestige, and political status accrue exclusively through the 
father’s line. Within such a social structure there must not be any suspicion 
that the male pedigree (often traceable in lineages that span centuries) is ‘cor-
rupted’ by doubtful paternity. Thus, revenge for sexual misbehaviour (rape, 
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adultery, abduction) warrants killing seven members of the oﬀender’s family, 
as compared to cases of murder, which call for the killing of the actual mur-
derer (or in some cases one of the murderer’s close kin). But hospitality 
trumps vengeance: If a group accepts a guest, all must honour him, even if 
prior grounds justify revenge. Violating the guest brings eternal shame to all, 
which is one good reason why the U.S. oﬀers of millions of dollars for betray-
ing Bin Laden continued to fail.
Afghan hill societies have withstood many would-be conquests and bouts 
of turmoil by keeping order with Pashtunwali in the absence of central 
authority and state institutions.12 When seemingly intractable conﬂicts arise, 
like repeating cycles of revenge, or problems caused by hosting guests and 
giving sanctuary, rival parties convene councils (jirgas) of elders and third 
parties to seek solutions through consensus.13 Although the Taliban argue 
that sharia always supersedes Pashtunwali, in fact, the Taliban’s idiosyncratic 
version of sharia incorporates Pashtunwali’s main tenets. For example, in 
allowing executions for murder or violations of women to be carried out by 
members of the aggrieved family, state punishment is confounded with per-
sonal revenge.
A common view in the West is that the blood-feuds and the restriction of 
women ‘to the home or the tomb’ are intrinsic to the Muslim religion or to 
the primitiveness of the Pashtun. However, anthropologists will tell you that 
the constant ﬁssion and fusion of the tribes, and stringent enforcement of 
women’s isolation from men, has more to do with the way some societies at 
the margins of the desert and the sown have adapted their social structures to 
extreme ﬂuctuations in the availability of resources and the intense competi-
tion for them. Arabs and Kurds,14 Pashtuns and Pathans,15 Persian Bakhtiaris 
and Baluchis,16 all share this basic social structure.
This social structure, which resembles a constantly branching tree, but 
where the branches become ever more entangled through marriage alliances, 
generates myriad ways of manoeuvring for control over women, ﬂocks, land, 
political allies and other resources. When resources become scarce and com-
petition intensiﬁes, tribal relationships may contract and the patrilineages 
12 Barﬁeld, T. (2003) Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Insti-
tutions. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace. Available at: www.usip.org/ﬁles/
barﬁeld2.pdf.
13 Wardak, A. (2002) “Jirga: Power and Traditional Conﬂict Resolution in Afghanistan”, in 
J. Strawson (ed.) Law after Ground Zero. London: Cavendish.
14 Atran, S. (1985) “Managing Arab kinship and marriage”. Social Science Information 24: 
659–696.
15 Barth, F. (1954) Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans. London: Athlone Press.
16 Pehrson, R. (1966) The Social Organization of the Marri Baluch. Chicago: Aldine.
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begin to tear apart at their branching points — thus, the saying: ‘Me against 
my brother, brothers against cousins, cousins against the clan, clans against 
the tribe, the tribes against the world.” These tribal segments, or factions, 
may then go on to seek out alliances of convenience even with distant and 
unrelated groups — hence, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend, even if 
the enemies of the moment are from one’s own kin group and the friends are 
from another.”*
A structural corollary to maintaining this ﬂexible system of alliances is the 
honour-bound duty to harbour the ‘guest,’ whether friend or foe (because 
any foe is also a potential friend, and vice versa). As Pennell noted, ‘the rela-
tionship between host and guest is inviolable.’ He leveraged this fact to get 
the mullahs, who otherwise would have had his head, to tolerate his medical 
missionary work: ‘After having oﬀered us hospitality and broken bread with 
us, we should be recognised as guests of the mullah, and any opposition 
which he might have been contemplating against us would be seen at once 
by the observant Afghans around to have been laid aside in favour of the 
reception due to an honoured guest.’17
Here is how anthropologist Thomas Barﬁeld analyses the internal Taliban 
debate over what to do with their Qaeda guests shortly after 9/11:
With a nuanced approach that would have done credit to any Pashtun tribal jirga, 
the assembled clerics told Omar that he must indeed protect his guest, but that 
because a guest should not cause his host problems Osama should be asked to leave 
Afghanistan voluntarily as soon as possible. It is notable that the question Omar 
tabled was not one of sharia jurisprudence, but rather an issue of Pashtunwali. Very 
ﬁttingly, the last major policy decision of the Taliban before they were driven from 
Afghanistan was based on good customary law standards in which religious law pro-
vided only window dressing.18
* Yet, this same branching structure can also merge into ever more inclusive and strongly-
tethered groups when opportunities to expand the resource base arise. For the most part, this 
social adaptation to a resource and security environment in ﬂux predates Islam, though parts of 
Muslim religious tradition have codiﬁed and ﬁxed aspects of it in places and situations far 
removed from the original context. Indeed, it is by harnessing the structural possibilities inher-
ent in the segmentary lineage system, and in the codes of honour and loyalty associated with it, 
that Mohammed (PBUH) and his successors were able to unite the fractious Arab tribes in one 
poor, small corner of the world, and expand their dominion across three continents. Of course, 
the lineage system strongly supported tribal loyalty, and it took great skill for Mohammed 
(PBUH) to transfer the primary loyalty of his followers from their tribes to a community of 
believers.
17 Pennell, T. (1909) Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier. Pp. 122–123.
18 Barﬁeld, T. (2003) Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institu-
tions. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, Pp. 36. Available at: http://www.
usip.org/ﬁles/barﬁeld2.pdf.
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Instead of keeping pressure on the Taliban to resolve the issue in ways they 
could live with,* the U.S. ridiculed their deliberation and bombed them into 
a closer alliance with Al-Qaeda. Pakistani Pashtun then oﬀered sanctuary to 
their Afghan brethren and guests.
Recently, someone who served with the U.S. Afghan mission for some 
years asked if I would be willing to help evaluate U.S. success in winning 
hearts and minds. The ﬁrst thing I asked her was: ‘Do the Afghans you’re in 
contact with accept Americans as guests, and do the Americans act as if 
they were guests?’ A bit startled, she answered, ‘Of course not, we’re here 
because we have to be.’ I then asked, ‘Do they act as if they are the hosts and 
masters?’ She didn’t respond at ﬁrst, so I gave her this scenario: ‘Surely you 
must have seen or heard about accidents on the road involving a U.S. mili-
tary vehicle colliding with some Afghan’s donkey-drawn cart. What hap-
pened? Do the American military personnel come out of the vehicle and try 
to help the poor fellow?’ Her answer: ‘Never. They leave the scene, those are 
the rules of the engagement; any Afghan knows where to ﬁnd us to lodge a 
complaint or make a claim.’ I told her that I’d bet my bottom dollar that Al-
Qaeda doesn’t behave that way, because they understand what it means to be 
a guest, and that’s one good reason why they have survived among the Pash-
tun tribes.
In the Summer of 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared: 
‘We and our Afghan allies stand ready to welcome anyone supporting the 
Taliban who renounces Al-Qaeda, lays down their arms, and is willing to 
participate in the free and open society that is enshrined in the Afghan 
constitution.’19 To get tribesmen to lay down arms that have preserved them 
for the sake of a ﬂag that many do not even know represents the country 
(some only recognise it as being the colours worn on enemy uniforms) is 
about as farfetched as getting the National Riﬂe Association to support a 
* While Mullah Omar readily gave sanctuary to Bin Laden after his expulsion from Sudan 
in 1996, Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the 
2000 bombing of the USS Cole, focused intense international hostility on the Taliban. In June 
2001, Omar declared that Bin Laden had no authority to issue fatwahs of any kind, conﬁscat-
ing the Qaeda leader’s satellite phone and putting him under armed guard. The 9/11 Commis-
sion Report notes (p. 65) that Mullah Omar had previously ‘invited’ Bin Laden to move to 
where he might be easier to control after the Al-Qaeda leader gave an inﬂammatory interview 
on CNN in 1997 that violated circumspection. For their part, a number of jihadi leaders 
denounced Bin Laden’s association with the ‘inﬁdel’ Taliban, religious deviants worthy of 
excommunication (takﬁr) who were ‘created and controlled by Pakistan’ and its intelligence 
services (ISI) (see Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (2007) Cracks in the Foundation: 
Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989–2006. Pp. 14ﬀ. Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/
aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf ). 
19 Kralev, N. (2009) “Clinton to Taliban: Forsake al Qaeda”. Washington Times, 16 July.
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constitutional amendment to repeal the right of Americans to bear arms. 
Moreover, as Marc Sageman rightly observes, ‘there’s no Al-Qaeda in Afghan-
istan and no Afghans in Al-Qaeda.’20 The original alliance between the Tali-
ban and Al-Qaeda was largely one of convenience between a poverty-stricken 
national movement and a transnational cause that brought material help. 
U.S. pressure on Pakistan to hit the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in their current 
sanctuary birthed the Pakistani Taliban, who forge their own ties to Al-Qaeda 
to undermine the Pakistani state that attacked them. While some Taliban use 
the rhetoric of global jihad to inspire their ranks or enlist foreign ﬁghters into 
their insurgency, they show no inclination to hit Western interests abroad. 
The continued presence of Al-Qaeda remnants in Pakistan, and Pakistani 
Taliban attacks on the state, including at least three attacks on nuclear21 facil-
ities, warrants concerted action in Pakistan, not Afghanistan. Pakistan under-
stands this and engages unaligned Taliban against anti-government and 
pro-Qaeda Taliban to meet the threat (well aware that all Taliban support 
insurgency against foreign troops in Afghanistan).22, 23, *
20 M. Sageman, personal communication, July 2009.
21 Gregory, S. (2009) “The terrorist threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons”. CTC Sentinel 2(7). 
Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf.
22 Rahimullah, R. (2009) “The signiﬁcance of Qari Zain’s assassination in Pakistan”. CTC 
Sentinel 2(7). Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss7.pdf.
23 In June 2009, Qari Zainuddin Mehsud, an important Taliban tribal commander with 
links to Pakistani security forces, was shot dead in NWFP by his own bodyguard. The assassi-
nation was ordered by fellow tribesman Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan’s Public Enemy No. 1, a 
week after Qari Zain went on national television to declare war against Baitullah and his Paki-
stan Taliban Movement (Tehrik-i-Taliban, TTP), an alliance of 13 Pashtun tribal factions that 
chose Baitullah to lead them in 2007. Qari Zain claimed to oppose Baitullah and the ‘renegade’ 
Taliban Movement for having brought terror to Pakistan in a campaign of ‘un-Islamic’ suicide 
attacks that began with the December 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto and spiralled on to kill or wound thousands of Muslims in mosques, madrassas 
and markets. Just days before Qari Zain’s death, Baitullah had pointedly rejected a call from 
Mullah Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban to whom both Qari Zain and Baitullah claimed 
loyalty, to stop killings in Pakistan and focus on ﬁghting U.S.-led allied forces in Afghanistan. 
An even greater motivation to oppose Baitullah was Qain Zain’s belief that Baitullah had 
betrayed their fellow clansman, Abdullah Mehsud, to Pakistan security forces in Baluchistan 
(where, in July 2007, Abdullah blew himself up with a hand grenade rather than give himself 
up). Interned at Guantánamo after surrendering to the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance in 
December 2001, Abdullah had returned a hero to his native Waziristan following his release in 
2004. There he gathered a force of up to 5,000 Taliban ﬁghters to attack coalition forces 
in Afghanistan, and commanded a regional following and respect that made Baitullah jealous. 
When Qari Zain proclaimed himself successor to Abdullah, Baitullah denounced both as 
thieves and ‘puppets’ of the Pakistani government.
In August 2009, Baitullah and his wife were killed in an American drone missile attack on 
his father-in-law’s house in South Waziristan. Tribesmen immediately began ﬁghting over suc-
cession (Hakimullah Mehsud, who is from the same sub-tribe as Baitailluh, won). Although 
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Here, despite U.S. pressure, Pakistan prefers a policy seasoned by wars 
of ‘respect for the independence and sentiment of the tribes’ advised by 
Lord Curzon as ‘we are dealing with an enemy habituated to every form and 
habit of guerrilla warfare, even if [military action] attended with maximum 
success, no permanent results can be obtained,’ while the Afghan frontier 
would be ‘ablaze from one end to the other [causing] an intolerable burden 
on ﬁnances.’24, *
U.S.-sponsored ‘reconciliation’ may be fatally ﬂawed in demanding that 
Pashtun hill tribes give up the arms that have kept them independent (or that 
they join pro-government militia), and support a constitution that values 
Western-inspired rights and judicial institutions over customary canons and 
forms of consensus that have sustained the tribes against all enemies. U.S. 
presidential envoy Richard Holbrooke suggests that victory in Afghanistan is 
U.S. presidential envoy Richard Hobrooke urged Pakistan to take advantage of the confusion 
and focus on shifting forces from the western border with India to try and ﬁnish oﬀ the Taliban 
in the East, the Pakistani army was well aware that no previous military campaign had ever suc-
ceeded against the combined forces of the tribes of Waziristan or the NWFP. The army and 
government also knew that the most eﬀective way to reduce the Taliban threat in their own 
country was to avoid uniting the tribes against them, which a full-scale invasion of the western 
frontier regions would do. However, Hakimullah stepped up a suicide campaign against Paki-
stani security forces in the Autumn of 2009, provoking large-scale army incursions into the 
tribal areas. These continued even after Hakimullah’s reported death in early 2010 by another 
U.S. drone missile.
24 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1908/feb/26/india-north-west-frontier-
policy#S4V0184P0_19080226_HOL_23.
* Still, Sir William Harcourt, a leader of the opposition, noted a dire contradiction in the 
military’s public call to step up activity that is similar to that of today: For ‘the Commander of 
the armies in conﬂict with those tribes says — civilisation and barbarism cannot exist conter-
minously [so] that the tribes should be controlled and disarmed . . . Well, I object altogether to 
any man in command of the armies proclaiming his own opinions upon a policy without 
authority from the Government under which he serves. It is contrary to the Constitution of 
this country . . . That is the way in which the independence of the tribes is to be respected [and] 
the tribes are to be conciliated[?] That is the mischief which has been the cause of the Afghan 
Wars.’ (http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1898/feb/15/address-in-answer-to-her-
majestys-most#S4V0053P0_18980215_HOC_113). In October 2009, Gen. McChrystal pub-
lically opined that counterterrorism must be replaced with a full-blown counterinsurgency to 
defeat the Taliban (this echoed McChrystal’s report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 
August 2009; see http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_
Redacted_092109.pdf ). Obama’s Security Advisor Jim Jones intimated that the General was 
out of line. The U.S. Constitution would seem to disallow anyone in the military from appeal-
ing to the public without the consent of the executive branch of the civilian government in 
order to inﬂuence policy. (There is one recent legislated exception: The Goldwater-Nichols Bill 
requires all and only members of the Joint Chiefs of Staﬀ to speak candidly to Congress when 
asked, even if their statements contradict the President.) That is one reason that Lincoln relieved 
Gen. McClellan and Truman properly ﬁred Gen. MacArthur.
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possible if those Taliban who pursue self interest, rather than ‘ideology,’ can 
be co-opted with material incentives. But as veteran war correspondent Jason 
Burke said to me: ‘Today, the logical thing for the Pashtun conservatives is to 
stop ﬁghting and get rich through narcotics or Western aid, the latter being 
much lower risk. But many won’t sell out.’25 Although newer, fair-weather 
Taliban are deep into drug trade, as are government allies who help to make 
it Afghanistan’s main economy, committed veteran Taliban have tended to 
avoid it on moral grounds.
Outsiders who do not understand local cultural and group dynamics tend 
to ride roughshod over values they don’t grasp. To improve women’s status in 
Pashtun lands may take time (it took women’s suﬀrage a century in our coun-
try) and, as the Soviets learned there, not by foreign programmes. As we ﬁnd 
again and again — in our research in Morocco, Palestine, Iran, Pakistan, 
India, and Indonesia26 —, helping to materially improve lives will not reduce 
support for violence, and can even increase it27 if people feel such help com-
promises their most cherished values.28 After all, do we really want to help 
build up a society with so-called friendlies or reconcilables who can turn to 
or away from us on a dime, rather than working with the other side’s sacred 
values even if some are hard to stomach?
When Less is More
Al-Qaeda is treading on thin ice globally, with ever dwindling ﬁnancial and 
popular support, and a drastically diminished ability to link up with other 
extremists worldwide, much less command and control them for major oper-
ations against us. Its lethal agents are being systematically hunted down, 
while those souls it seeks to save are increasingly revolted by its methods and 
its abuse of religion. In an October 2009 brieﬁng to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, Marc Sageman noted that:
25 J. Burke, personal communication, January 2009.
26 Ginges, J. and S. Atran (2009) “Non-instrumental reasoning over sacred values: An Indo-
nesian ﬁeld experiment”, in D. Bartels, C. Bauman, L. Skitka, and D. Medin (eds.) Psychology 
of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making. San Diego, CA: Aca-
demic Press.
27 Deghani, M., R. Iliev, S. Sachdeva, S. Atran, J. Ginges and D. Medin (2009) “Emerging 
sacred values: Iran’s nuclear program”. Judgment and Decision Making 4:530–533.
28 Atran, S., R. Axelrod and R. Davis (2007) “Sacred barriers to conﬂict resolution”. Science 
317: 1039–1040.
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Seventy-eight per cent of all global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West in the past 
ﬁve years came from autonomous home-grown groups without any connection, 
direction or control from Al-Qaeda Core or its allies. The ‘resurgent Al-Qaeda’ in the 
West argument has no empirical foundation. The paucity of actual Al-Qaeda and 
other transnational terrorist organisation plots compared to the number of autono-
mous plots refutes the claims by some heads of the Intelligence Community that all 
Islamist plots in the West can be traced back to the Afghan-Pakistani border. Far 
from being the ‘epicentre of terrorism,’ this Pakistani region is more like the ﬁnishing 
school of global neo-jihadi terrorism, where a few amateur wannabes are transformed 
into dangerous terrorists.29
The real threat is home-grown youths who gain inspiration from Osama bin 
Laden but little else beyond an occasional self-ﬁnanced spell at some make-
shift Qaeda-linked training facility in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia or the Sahel.
That said, this weakening viral movement that abuses religion is on the 
threshold of a new lease on life in Afghanistan and Pakistan because we keep 
pushing it and the Taliban together. By building an unmerited sense of threat 
from Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, we are making it a greater threat to Pakistan 
and the world. Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan are unlike Iraq, 
the ancient birthplace of central government, or Vietnam, which had a strong 
state backing insurgents. They must be dealt with on their own terms.
We’re winning against Al-Qaeda and its kin in places where anti-terrorism 
eﬀorts are local and built on an understanding that the ties binding terrorist 
networks today are more cultural and familial than political . Consider recent 
events in Southeast Asia. In September, Indonesian security forces killed 
Noordin Muhammad Top, then on the F.B.I.’s ‘most-wanted terrorists’ list. 
Implicated in the region’s worst suicide bombings — including the JW Mar-
riott and Ritz-Carlton bombings in Jakarta on 17 July of the same year — 
Noordin Top headed a splinter group of the extremist religious organisation 
Jemaah Islamiyah (he called it ‘Al-Qaeda for the Malaysian Archipelago’). 
Research by my colleagues and me, supported by the National Science Foun-
dation and the Defense Department, reveals three critical factors in such 
groups inspired by Al-Qaeda, all of which local security forces implicitly 
grasp but American counter-intelligence workers seem to underestimate.
What binds these groups together? First is friendship forged through ﬁght-
ing: The Indonesian volunteers who fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan 
styled themselves as the Afghan Alumni, and many kept in contact when 
they returned home after the War. The second is school ties and discipleship: 
29 Sageman, M. (2009) “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the threat in Afghanistan 
and beyond; Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 7”. Available at: 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/SagemanTestimony091007p.pdf.
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Many leading operatives in Southeast Asia come from a handful of religious 
schools aﬃliated with Jemaah Islamiyah. Out of some 30,000 religious 
schools in Indonesia, only about 50 have a deadly legacy of producing violent 
extremists. Third is family-ties: As anyone who has watched the opening 
scene from ‘The Godfather’ knows, weddings can be terriﬁc opportunities 
for networking and plotting.
Understanding these three aspects of terrorist networking has given law 
enforcement a leg up on the jihadists. Gen. Tito Karnavian, the leader of the 
strike team that tracked down Noordin Top, told me that ‘knowledge of the 
interconnected networks of Afghan Alumni, friendship, kinship and marriage 
groups was very crucial to uncovering the inner circle of Noordin.’30 Con-
sider Noordin Top’s third marriage, which cemented ties to key suspects in 
the lead-up to the recent hotel bombings. His father-in-law, who founded a 
Jemaah Islamiyah-related boarding school, stashed explosives in his garden 
with the aid of another teacher at the school. Using electronic intercepts and 
tracing family, school and alumni ties, police oﬃcers found the cache in late 
June 2009. That discovery may have prompted Noordin Top to initiate the 
hotel attacks ahead of a planned simultaneous attack on the residence of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
In addition, an Afghan Alumnus and nephew of Noordin Top’s father-in-
law was being pursued by the police for his role in a failed plot to blow up a 
tourist cafe on Sumatra. Unfortunately, Noordin Top struck the hotels before 
the Indonesian police could penetrate the entire network, in part because 
another family group was still operating under the police radar. This group 
included a ﬂorist who smuggled the bombs into the hotels and a man whose 
eventual arrest led to discovery of the plot against the president. Both terror-
ists were married to sisters of a Yemeni-trained imam who recruited the hotel 
suicide bombers, and of another brother who had inﬁltrated Indonesia’s 
national airline.31 Had the police pulled harder on the pieces of social yarn 
they had in hand, they might have unravelled the hotel plot earlier. Still, their 
work thwarted attacks planned for the future, including that on the country’s 
president.
Similarly, security oﬃcials in the Philippines have combined intelligence 
and training from American and Australian sources with similar tracking 
eﬀorts to crack down on their terrorist networks and, as a result, most 
extremist groups are either seeking reconciliation with the government — 
including the deadly Moro Islamic Liberation Front on the island of 
30 Gen. Tito Karnavian, personal communication, 10 December 2009.
31 International Crisis Group (2009) “Indonesia: Noordin Top’s support base”. Asia Brieﬁng 
95(27 August). Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6289&l=1.
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Mindanao — or have devolved into kidnapping-and-extortion gangs with no 
ideological focus. The separatist Abu Sayyaf Group, once the most feared 
force in the region, now has no overall spiritual or military leaders, few weap-
ons and only a hundred or so ﬁghters.32
So, how does this relate to a strategy against Al-Qaeda in the West and in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan?
In the West, Al-Qaeda’s main focus, there has not been a successful attack 
directly commanded by Bin Laden and company since 9/11 (though the 
2005 London Underground attack included someone who attended a small 
Al-Qaeda training facility in Pakistan). The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghani-
stan decimated Al-Qaeda’s core of top personnel and destroyed its training 
facilities. Bin Laden went into hiding in the adjacent border regions of Paki-
stan, unable since to form a new cadre of Al-Qaeda leaders or set up facilities 
as remotely sophisticated as those destroyed.
After the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London train bombings, various Euro-
pean security and law enforcement agencies stepped up coordination in 
tracking local jihadi groups, as well as community outreach programmes to 
immigrant Muslim youth, and stopped plots from coming to fruition. Simi-
lar steps have been taken by Turkey, Morocco and Saudi Arabia.
Now, we need to bring a similar perspective to bear in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan that is smart about cultures, customs and connections because the 
present policy of focusing on footprints and drones, and trying to win over 
people by improving their lives with aid programmes that we concoct, only 
follows a long history of foreign involvement and failure.
Of course, anti-terrorism measures are only as eﬀective as the local govern-
ments that execute them. Afghanistan’s government is corrupt, unpopular 
and inept. So what do we do? There’s no Taliban central to talk to (although 
the U.S. and NATO are talking to locals who ﬁght them, with some local 
successes). To be a Taliban today means little more than to be a Pashtun 
tribesman who believes that his fundamental beliefs and customary way of 
life, including the right to bear arms to defend the tribal homeland and pro-
tect its women when threatened by foreign invaders and local associates.33 
Although most Taliban claim loyalty to Afghanistan’s Mullah Omar, this alle-
giance varies greatly: Pakistani Taliban leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud 
who was killed by an American drone in August 2009, and his successor 
32 Chalk, P. (2009) “The Philippines’ continued success against extremists”. CTC Sentinel 
2(8). Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss8.pdf.
33 Giustozzi, A. (ed.) (2009) Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field. New 
York: Columbia University Press.
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Hakimullah Mehsud , rejected Mullah Omar’s call to forego suicide bomb-
ings against Pakistani civilians.
It is we who hold the Taliban together. Without us, their deeply-divided 
coalition could well fragment. The resurgent strength of today’s Taliban 
depends on support by notoriously unruly Pashtun hill tribes in Pakistan’s 
border regions unsympathetic to the original Taliban programme of homoge-
nising tribal custom and politics under one rule. The Taliban could also well 
kick out Bin Laden if he became more obnoxious to them than we are: 
Al-Qaeda may have close relations to the Haqqani network of the Zadran 
tribe in North Waziristan and to the Shabi-Khel sub-tribe of the Mehsud of 
South Waziristan, but Al-Qaeda is not so popular with many Taliban factions 
and forces.
We have already been through one round of cranking up forces in Afghan-
istan, and it backﬁred. Until 2004, the U.S.-led NATO coalition had a mod-
est footprint in Afghanistan of about 20,000 troops, mainly to protect Kabul, 
and there were few terrorist acts, such as suicide attacks and roadside bomb-
ings: Fewer than ten from 2001 to 2004. During 2005, the coalition started 
to ratchet up troop levels in order to wipe out the last vestiges of the Taliban 
and to eradicate poppy crops. According to data collected by Robert Pape, 
suicide attacks increased by an order of magnitude — with nine in 2005, 
nearly 100 in 2006, 142 in 2007, and 148 in 2008.34 There were 739 road-
side bombings in 2006, nearly 2,000 in 2007, and more than 3,200 in 2008. 
Unlike Iraq, nearly all suicide attacks and roadside bombings have targeted 
coalition forces and installations rather than the civilian population. By 2009, 
Western forces were deployed in all major regions, including the Pashtun 
areas in the South and East, and numbered well over 100,000, on par with 
the Soviet military involvement two decades before that produced the condi-
tions for the emergence of the Taliban in the ﬁrst place.
In August 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. general in Afghan-
istan, wrote to Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the situation had become 
‘serious . . . we face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a 
crisis of conﬁdence among Afghans — in both their government and the 
international community — that undermines our credibility and emboldens 
the insurgents.’35 McChrystal’s report explained that a radical change in U.S. 
policy was needed for two reasons: ‘[O]ur conventional warfare culture has 
alienated the people,’ and there is a lack of ‘responsive and accountable gov-
ernment’ to win them over. The report recommended ‘radically expanded 
34 Pape, R. (2009) “To beat the Taliban, ﬁght from afar”. New York Times, 15 October.
35 http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_
092109.pdf.
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coalition forces at every echelon,’ to gain the initiative and to protect ‘those 
critical areas where the population is most threatened.’ But the history of the 
region suggests that more foreign footprints are more likely to rally the tribes 
against us than to us.
There was precious little in the report to suggest that our continuing sup-
port of the central government would make it any less corroded. As one sen-
ior U.S. counter-narcotics oﬃcial put it to me in September 2009:
My personal opinion is that Karzai’s brother is a crook, and is involved in construct-
ing the framework of what Afghanistan is becoming, where there is no other econ-
omy than the drug trade. With the fox in the henhouse, the hens will never be safe. 
[The Departments of ] Defense and State have spent close to 10 billion [dollars] to 
counter [the drug economy] in Afghanistan. If you look at just eradication, it’s close 
to 4 billion. There were some years where we eradicated less than 500 hectares per 
year, or more that 10 million per hectare, which doesn’t make sense.
Even in a ‘good’ year, like 2008, only 5,000 hectares were eradicated out of 
more than 150,000 cultivated. A three per cent risk on losing a crop would 
deter nobody from planting poppies for huge proﬁt.36, *
When the Taliban ruled they were morally rigid and did detestable things, 
especially to women, but by and large they were not corrupt. The people 
hardly loved the Taliban, but appreciated that they stopped widespread rape 
and pillage, and eﬀectively brought order to the country.
The original Taliban were just as aggressive as the communists in trying to 
use military force to impose a single political administration and worldview 
on the fractious Afghan population. But the Taliban were far less centralised, 
and their worldview was far less alien to the Pashtun tribes whose children, 
orphaned and separated from their elders by the war against the communists 
and then civil war, had become the foot soldiers of the Taliban’s New Order.
General McChrystal’s report relied on a number of celebrity politicos, 
although only one had considerable experience with the people of Afghanistan 
36 See also Dickey, C. (2009) “Losing Afghanistan’s drug war”. Newsweek, July 31. Available 
at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/209830.
* Other moral issues plague U.S.-backed policies in Afghanistan. For example, oﬀers of 
amnesty have perversely allowed people to ﬁght on until they feel it is not in their interests, 
because their oﬀer of surrender could be accepted at any time, even if they have massacred 
before or have broken away to ﬁght again. This has allowed serious killers to go free, while Tali-
ban cooks and drivers were left rotting in Afghanistan’s Bagram prison and Guantánamo Bay 
(see Nathan, J. (2009) “A review of reconciliation eﬀorts in Afghanistan”. CTC Sentinel 2(8)). 
The Pashtun tribes readily see their customary practices as much fairer and eﬀective in the long 
run, than such arbitrary justice.
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(former National Public Radio reporter Sarah Chays).37 The ﬁve teams of a 
two-year ‘Human Terrain System’ experiment in Helmand, Paktia and other 
Afghan Pashtun areas, which embedded uniformed and armed cultural 
anthropologists in infantry units, also provided ‘peripheral input’ (as one 
team member put it to me). Nevertheless, the report was a public relations 
and political success, despite the constitutional eﬀorts of our nation’s found-
ers to ensure that the military would never be able to directly shape public 
policy. It prodded President Obama to commit 30,000 more troops to a 
counter-insurgency eﬀort against a major segment of the Afghan population, 
with the focus on converting a deeply unpopular and corrupt regime into a 
uniﬁed, centralised state for the ﬁrst time in that country’s history. All of this 
supposedly to prevent Al-Qaeda’s return to a place where they would not 
likely be welcome in any event.
Unlike Al-Qaeda, the Taliban are interested in their homeland, not ours. 
Things are diﬀerent now than before 9/11. The Taliban know how costly 
keeping Al-Qaeda can be. There’s a good chance that enough of the factions 
in the loose and fractious Taliban coalition would decide for themselves to 
disinvite their troublesome guest if we contained them by maintaining pres-
sure without trying to subdue them or hold their territory, intervening only 
when we see movement to help Al-Qaeda or act beyond the region. A long 
leash on the Taliban is likely to be far more eﬀective than a short one. Fur-
thermore, in the ﬁght against violent extremism more generally, as far as our 
direct involvement goes, less just may be more.
37 Rosen, N. (2010) “Something from nothing: U.S. strategy in Afghanistan”. Boston Review, 
January/February. Available at: http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php.
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